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SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
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TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF UN EU SU LY FR CD

SUBJECT: LIBYAN AMBASSADOR BRIEFS ON TRIPOLI?S
?TRILATERAL INITIATIVE? TO BRING PEACE BETWEEN CHAD
AND SUDAN

CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS
1.4(B) AND (D).

¶11. (C) Libyan Ambassador Emhemmed Shlback briefed me on Libya?s recent ?Trilateral Initiative? to bring peace between Chad and Sudan August 5. Shlback said that Qaddafi believed that the time was now ripe to try to bring the two feuding leaders back to the more productive relationship they once enjoyed. He said that this was the first step in a two-step process: ?First, we want to bring these two friends of ours together; then we will work on a solution to the Darfur situation.? Shlback said he himself understood more of the details of this first step than of the second one.

¶12. (C) I asked why Tripoli believed that an initiative of this kind could be effective just now, Shlback replied that Libya believed that Sudan?s President Bashir was ready for a rapprochement with Chad because he had been weakened politically by three developments: The near-miss May JEM attack on Khartoum; the deteriorating situation in Darfur; and the recent ICCC legal action against him. Shlback said that Chad?s President Deby was similarly ready because he greatly feared the possibility of renewed Chad rebel offensives at the end of the current rainy season, in October or November, having been shaken by rebel successes in February and June.

¶13. (C) Shlback said the Libyan initiative had three main elements: The two countries must cease all propaganda and media attacks on each other immediately; the two countries must reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen borders immediately; and the two leaders should be prepared to accept an invitation to a summit meeting in Tripoli as soon as possible. He placed great emphasis on the necessity for the two sides to act ?immediately, no studying, no analyzing.? Shlback said Libya was very happy with the initial reactions of N?Djamena and Khartoum to Dr. Ali Treki?s diplomacy over the last weekend.

¶14. (C) Shlback said that the essence of the Libyan initiative was to pressure both leaders to end support for rebel groups on their own territory. It was now up to N?Djamena and Khartoum to take action that aimed at that goal. Shlback said that Libya had played a mediating role between the GOC and Chad rebels before, leading up to the 2007 Sirte Accord. He said that Sirte was still valid, but when I inquired that in case the Chad rebels needed a ?refresher course? on what they had signed on to at Sirte, Shlback relied

that he could suggest to Tripoli that they might be invited there for a few weeks of talks if that were necessary. Shlback said that he himself was not empowered to speak to neither Chadian rebels nor Sudanese rebels. But he emphasized that Tripoli believed that it was well within the ability of both Deby and Bashir to effectively end support for rebel groups in their countries. When I asked how Tripoli would be able to verify compliance with this goal, Shlback replied, ?We will know; we will know.?

¶ 15. (C) Shlback said that Libya?s initiative was not/not intended to replace the implementation process of the March Dakar Accord. It was rather to reinforce the Dakar Process that Libya acted ?trilaterally.? He said that Libya intended to continue to support the Dakar Process and to participate as a member of its Contact Group.

¶ 16. (C) I told Shlback that the USG was in favor of efforts by African friends of Chad and Sudan to reduce tensions between them. And of course, we all sought progress toward a resolution of the Darfur crisis. I asked him to query his government regarding steps that the wider international community, including the United States, might consider doing to support the Libyan initiative, especially things which could of course be done quietly and in consultation with Tripoli. I emphasized that I was sure that the United States would not act in a way that would tend to efface Libya?s role as protagonist of peace regarding Chad and Sudan, but might seek to act diplomatically and politically to second Libyan efforts. Shlback said

that he appreciated such a positive USG view of his country?s efforts in Chad and Sudan and that he would refer the issue of a possible supportive stance to his government.

¶ 17. (C) Comment: It seems only logical to encourage Tripoli?s latest initiative, given our support for its efforts to broker peace between Chad and Sudan, as well as its efforts to mediate between Deby and the Chad rebel chieftains, as at Sirte in 2007 and more recently in Tripoli with Erdimi?s RFC group. I have tried since his arrival to build a close working and personal relationship with shlback and will continue to do so.

NIGRO